This work proposes a novel algorithm to generate natural language adversarial input for text classification models, in order to investigate the robustness of these models. It involves applying gradient-based perturbation on the sentence embeddings that are used as the features for the classifier, and learning a decoder for generation. We employ this method to a sentiment analysis model and verify its effectiveness in inducing incorrect predictions by the model. We also conduct quantitative and qualitative analysis on these examples and demonstrate that our approach can generate more natural adversaries. In addition, it can be used to successfully perform black-box attacks, which involves attacking other existing models whose parameters are not known. On a public sentiment analysis API, the proposed method introduces a 20% relative decrease in average accuracy and 74% relative increase in absolute error.
Introduction
Adversarial attacks on neural networks have drawn a significant amount of attention. The majority of these attacks are targeting computer vision models in which convolutional neural networks (CNN) are employed. Due to the fact that input features to these models are continuous, we can apply perturbation that is indistinguishable by humans. (Szegedy et al., 2013) . In contrast, generating adversarial samples has not been attempted for natural language processing (NLP) models until recently. The discrete nature of the input obfuscates the use of existing methods of generating adversarial examples (Papernot et al., 2016) . Unlike image data, textual input consists of individual words that are represented by embeddings (Mikolov et al., 2013) , but we cannot directly apply perturbation to them and find another word. Several approaches have been pro-posed to solve this problem, such as a Gumbel-Softmax (Kusner and Hernández-Lobato, 2016) , policy gradient, and Monte-Carlo search (Yu et al., 2017) . However, most existing methods try to minimize the number of word edits, which often lead to unnaturalness that is easily detected by humans (Jia and Liang, 2017; Zhao et al., 2018) . How to create a generative model for natural adversarial examples remains an unsolved problem. Thus, we propose a novel approach that employs a sequence decoder to create natural adversarial examples.
In addition, adversarial attacks can be categorized into two scenarios, i.e., white-box and black-box. The former has access to the parameters and structure of the model, and the latter lacks such information (Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan, 2016) . Black-box attacks are more challenging in that they usually require a large number of queries to the model. However, they are more valuable towards evaluating machine learning models (Papernot et al., 2017) .
This work aims to generate adversarial sentences that are natural as well as capable of whitebox and black-box attacks. We propose a novel algorithm that perturbs the sentence encoding by calculating gradients w.r.t. an alternative class, and utilize a well-trained decoder for sequence generation. We also experiment with a black-box attack against an online sentiment classifier. The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows. 
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Attacker Model Gradients w.r.t. other class LSTM Encoder Figure 1 : Illustration of the proposed attack model. The classifier network consists of an LSTM encoder followed by a fully connected layer, and the attacker consists of an LSTM decoder.
methods.
4. Perform black-box attacks against a real world online sentiment classifier to validate the effectiveness of our approach.
Methodology
At the outset, we train the target of our attack, which is an LSTM-based sequence classifier. We assume this target model follows the encoder-based framework: given an input x, an encoder is used to generate the encoded input z = Encoder(x), and then the predicted label is computed by the classifier y = h(z). Loss for the model is defined as the cross-entropy between the predicted class and true class labels.
Generating Adversarial Examples
In our adversarial example generation algorithm, we first calculate gradients of the encoder output w.r.t. a target (opposite) label, and apply perturbation on the encoder output using FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) method before sending it to the decoder. The problem can be formulated as minimizing the loss function
is the output of the classifier h(·), y adv is the adversarial target class.
To facilitate the white-box attack setting, a decoder D(·) is trained using the output of the encoder z such that D(z) = x . Loss for the decoder is defined as the cross-entropy between the input sequence and decoded sequence. To generate adversarial examples, we first pass the original input sentence into the encoder and obtain a sequence encoding as well as the classifier output. Then, we calculate gradients of the classifier output w.r.t. a fake target and propagate back to the sentence encoding. Specifically, the cross entropy of the classifier outputŷ against the fake target y adv is defined as
The fake target y adv is set to be the opposite of the original label. We then obtain the gradient of L adv with respect to the encoded input x as ∇ z L adv (h(z), y adv ). Finally, we apply FGSM as follows:
Note that applying the gradient step with more iterations such as PGD-attack (Madry et al., 2017) could potentially boost the performance, but we found one step of FGSM already leads to a good solution in the embedding space. The perturbed encoding z adv is sent to the decoder D(·) for generation of an adversarial sequence x adv = D(z adv ). We can then gradually perturb the sentence encoding by increasing . In this way, we can modulate the perturbation on the sentence encoding space and observe its impact on the classifier as well as the generator.
Experiments
Dataset
We utilize the Yelp reviews polarity dataset released by Zhang et al. (2015) in our experiments. It contains 280,000 training samples and 19,000 test samples for each polarity. At the outset, each review is tokenized using the spaCy English tokenizer. Then, we apply byte-pair encoding (Sennrich et al., 2016) to further segment words into subword units. The vocabulary size is limited to approximately 8,000 subwords. Finally, each review is cropped to maximally 30 units.
Model Architecture
The input sequence is converted to embeddings (Mikolov et al., 2013) with 512 dimensions. We train a 1-layer LSTM encoder and decoder, both with hidden dimensions of 512. The encoder is regularized using the method and hyperparameters proposed by Zhao et al. (2017) . In addition, a 100-dimension fully connected network follows the encoder as the classifier. The classifier and decoder are trained for 20 epochs until it converges on 94% classification accuracy on the training set and 86% on the test set.
Evaluation Metrics
Objective evaluation involves gradually increasing the value and observe multiple metrics on the test set, namely, mis-classification rate of the classifier and average BLEU score (Papineni et al., 2002) . Mis-classification rate denotes the percentage that the classifier produces an incorrect label, and BLEU scores evaluate the overlap of the original input and its corresponding adversarial example. We also calculate a language model trained on the training set to estimate the quality of the generated examples.
On the other hand, subjective analysis include human evaluation of the readability and sentiment of sentences generated by both methods. We recruit Amazon Mechanical Turkers to determine the naturalness and sentiment of the examples. We further validate the effectiveness of these two methods on a free online sentiment analysis service by measuring the variation in accuracy and absolute error.
The compared method proposed by Papernot et al. (2016) utilizes the Jacobian-based saliency map attack (denoted as JSMA). It consists of greedily substituting each word in the input sequence with the most salient candidate. The salient feature is produced by computing gradients of word features with regards to a target class.
Results
Quantitative analysis of the effect of adversarial examples on the classifier is visualized in Figure 2 . We observe that the mis-classification (error) rate positively relates to the epsilon value. However, the decrease in BLEU score is not drastic. This indicates that our method can successfully fool the classifier with only a few modifications. Furthermore, we train a language model that obtains a log perplexity of 4.2 on the training set in order to evaluate the similarity of the generated sentences.
The adversarial examples that our model generated using the test set obtain a log perplexity of 4.8, while that of the JSMA method is 6.1. This again demonstrates that our method can produce sentences that are more similar to the distribution 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% ! 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.020 0.024 0.028 0.032 0.036 mis-classification bleu Figure 2 : The effect of increasing the value on misclassification rate and BLEU scores on the test set. of the training data.
Next, we observe the results from human evaluation of the readability and 'human accuracy' of judging the sentiment of the adversarial examples. Recall that a better adversarial example should have a higher readability and not affect human judgment of the sentiment, therefore obtain a greater human accuracy score. Snippets of an original and generated sentence is listed in Table 1 . We refer readers to Appendix A for more examples created by different methods. 600 samples using = 0.02 are randomly selected from the test set for human evaluation, and the results are presented in Table 2 . In average, the workers give a higher readability score 0.63 to the sentences generated by our method, as opposed to 0.37 by the compared method. As for the human accuracy scores, they indicate that the sentiment remains unchanged for the human judges, which is a desirable trait in adversarial examples. Results show that our method is only slightly better with a human accuracy of 46.6%. Although our method is superior at generating natural sentences, it remains a challenge to create natural language adversaries that are unnoticeable by humans. Finally, we attempt a black-box attack by sending the same adversarial sentences that were used in the human judgment task above into the Amazon Comprehend API for sentiment analysis. We Method Readability Human Accuracy JSMA 0.59 45.9% Ours 1 46.6% Table 2 : Human evaluation of the adversarial examples generated by two methods. Readability is a relative measure of the naturalness of the sentences, and human accuracy refers to the percentage of examples that are correctly classified by human raters.
verify that they can successfully cause the classifier to predict incorrect sentiment labels, as indicated in Figure 3 , even though their model is not our intended target. Our method can reduce accuracy by 20% (77% → 61%) and increase error by 74% (0.43 → 0.73) relatively of the online classifier. These effects are comparable to those caused by the compared method. Taking into account the fact that human judges favor the sentences generated by our method as more readable, we believe the proposed model is superior at generating natural adversarial examples. 
Related Work
An abundant amount of work has been done on adversarial attacks that target CNNs. On the other hand, attempts to attack Recurrent neural networks (RNN) are relatively few and far between. LSTM (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) cell is commonly used in sequence to sequence (Sutskever et al., 2014) or sequence classification RNNs. Most existing methods try to identify the most crucial words or positions to perform edits such as substituting, deleting, or inserting. Several gradient-based methods are used to find such words or positions Samanta and Mehta, 2017; Yang et al., 2018) . Fast Gradient Sign Method (Goodfellow et al., 2015) is used to produce an adversarial input to RNN-based classifiers (Papernot et al., 2016; . Ebrahimi et al. (2018) propose 'HotFilp' that replaces the word or character that possesses the largest difference in the Jacobian matrix. Li et al. (2016) employs reinforcement learning to find the best words to delete. Jia and Liang (2017) attempts to craft adversarial input to a question answering system by inserting irrelevant sentences at the end of a paragraph. Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) has also been used to produce natural adversarial examples by Zhao et al. (2018) . However, their work perturbs the latent code produces by the GAN, whereas the current research alters the encoder's output directly. Moreover, Cheng et al. (2018) develop an algorithm for attacking sequence-tosequence models with specific constraints on the content of the adversarial examples. Belinkov and Bisk (2018) employ typos and generate artificial noise as adversarial input to machine translation models. Rule-based attack has the advantage of generating examples that are guaranteed to be natural (Ribeiro et al., 2018) . However, it is not easy to select the best rule(s) for each input sequence. This work differs from previous research in that we operate on the sentence encoding space. One major benefit is that the proposed method can generate more natural sentence given enough training of the decoder, whereas other word-level modifications often produce ungrammatical sentences (Papernot et al., 2016; Samanta and Mehta, 2017; Yang et al., 2018) . Also, compared to rule-based methods, our approach has a higher rate of success. Furthermore, our method allows a gradual modification of the polarity of generated text, whereas other methods simply inverts the polarity.
Conclusions
We propose a novel adversarial example generation method via gradient-based perturbation on the sentence embeddings, and a well-trained decoder. Experimental results show that it successfully attacks classifiers in white-box and blackbox scenarios, and the naturalness of these sentences is validated via human evaluation. Future work involves conducting more comprehensive experiments on other tasks such as machine translation or question answering. We also plan
